South Sudan, heavily dependent on its oil exports, is seeing the revival of this activity jeopardized by the military situation in Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary militia led by Mohamed Hamdane Daglo, known as Hemedti, control strategic infrastructures essential to the export of South Sudanese crude.
This control is preventing any effective resumption of oil flows, which have been blocked for over a year, and is having major repercussions on the South Sudanese economy. The country, 90% of whose revenues are generated by the oil sector, has been losing around $100 million a month since the suspension of exports.
These losses also affect Sudan, which benefits from transit rights for South Sudanese oil passing through its territory.
However, the RSF, in the midst of its rivalry with Sudanese President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has strategic leverage in maintaining its grip on the oil infrastructure.
Strategic blocking of RSFs
The RSF’s control over the pumping stations represents a major obstacle to the resumption of exports for South Sudan.
By holding this key position, Hemedti and his paramilitary forces are imposing conditions on Sudan’s internal political negotiations.
The rivalry between Hemedti and al-Burhan is thus being played out on several fronts, further complicating any rapid resolution of the situation.
The ability of the RSF to block exports is an asset for Hemedti in his negotiations with al-Burhan.
This strategy is delaying progress in discussions aimed at restoring oil flows, an essential element in the economic stabilization of the region.
The threat posed by this military control is not limited to relations between the two Sudanese generals, but extends to the entire South Sudanese economy.
Economic consequences for South Sudan
The prolonged stalemate is having dramatic repercussions for South Sudan’s economy.
The African Development Bank (AfDB) forecasts that, without a recovery in exports, South Sudan’s current account deficit will remain at 7% of GDP in 2023/2024, limiting the country’s ability to finance its infrastructure and public services.
A recovery could reduce this deficit to 4% in 2024/2025, but this prospect depends entirely on the progress of negotiations in Sudan.
The interruption of oil flows is also affecting price stability on international markets, as South Sudanese oil is an important component of regional exports.
The persistence of this blockage maintains pressure on the country’s economic equilibrium, exacerbating internal tensions and limiting Juba’s room for maneuver on the international stage.
Alternatives for Sudan
On the Sudanese side, the need to secure its own exports is prompting the authorities to consider logistical alternatives.
A pipeline project linking Sudan to Djibouti, via Ethiopia, is currently under study.
Although Djibouti has expressed its support for this initiative, its implementation could take several years, delaying any beneficial effects in the short term.
If implemented, this project would diversify export routes, reducing dependence on infrastructure shared with South Sudan.
The issue of energy infrastructure remains critical for Sudan, which is seeking to stabilize its economy while coping with a prolonged political crisis.
Transit fees linked to South Sudanese oil are an important source of revenue for Khartoum, particularly against a backdrop of financial instability and inflation.
The completion of this pipeline could nevertheless offer some relief in the medium term, while changing the geopolitical dynamics of the region.
Internal rivalries and regional implications
The conflict between Hemedti and al-Burhan has a direct impact on economic relations between Sudan and South Sudan.
Until these internal political tensions are resolved, prospects for a recovery in oil exports will remain fragile.
This situation amplifies the challenges facing Juba, highlighting the country’s dependence on the stability of Sudan.
Internal rivalries in Sudan are also complicating the efforts of international investors and economic partners, who are awaiting a swift resolution before considering a resumption of investment in the oil sector.
Without a stable agreement between the various Sudanese factions, economic prospects for South Sudan and Sudan will remain limited in the short term.
